The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures by Sykes, Alan O.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2003
The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
Alan O. Sykes
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan O. Sykes, "The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 186, 2003).
 CHICAGO 





The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
 
Alan O. Sykes 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 




This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=415789
  
THE ECONOMICS OF WTO RULES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
 




 Subsidies present thorny problems for the international trading system. The 
legitimate activities of governments inevitably affect the economic position of firms 
within their jurisdictions, yet the perception sometimes arises that government programs 
confer an unacceptable advantage on those firms. The controversial task of determining 
which sorts of government activities create unacceptable advantages, and what to do 
about them, has occupied an important place on the agenda of the WTO/GATT system 
since its inception. 
 
 The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations produced an important new WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”). It also established 
separate rules for agricultural subsidies in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and took 
some minimal steps toward addressing subsidies issues in services industries within the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”). Because the rules on subsidies 
within GATS are so undeveloped,1 I will concentrate here on trade in goods, with 
primary emphasis on the SCM agreement and only a few words to say about agriculture. 
 
 In brief, I suggest that some of the WTO disciplines on subsidies are useful and 
sensible from an economic perspective, particularly (a) the nonviolation nullification and 
impairment doctrine that protects the market access expectations associated with 
particular trade commitments from frustration due to the introduction of unexpected 
subsidy programs; and (b) the general prohibition on export subsidies (outside of 
agriculture). The treatment of domestic subsidies under WTO law is far more 
problematic, in substantial measure because of the conceptual and practical difficulties in 
determining what constitutes an undesirable "subsidy." Further, the opportunity for 
importing nations to employ countervailing duties in the WTO system is likely a source of 
more harm than good. From the standpoint of welfare economics, a strong argument can 
be made that the WTO system should give up on its efforts to discipline domestic 
subsidies through general rules, and concentrate on the few sectors (such as agriculture) 
where a consensus arises that pressures for competitive subsidization are a source of 
economic waste. Likewise, global welfare would likely increase if general authority for 
the use of countervailing duties were eliminated. 
 
                                                 
* Frank & Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful for thoughtful 
comments to participants in the Law and Economics Workshop at Northwestern University.  I thank 
Jessica Romero for able research assistance. 
1For a discussion of how subsidies issues might eventually be addressed within GATS, see Gilles 
Gauthier, Erin O'Brien & Susan Spencer, Deja Vu, or New Beginning for Safeguards and Subsidies Rules 
in Services Trade?, in GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 165 
(Pierre Sauve and Robert Stern eds. 2000).  
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 Part I of this chapter provides an introduction to the economic issues that bear on 
the regulation of subsidies and countervailing measures. Part II then provides some legal 
background, beginning with the treatment of subsidies and countervailing measures in the 
GATT system prior to the Uruguay Round, and proceeding to consider the important 
developments in the law of the WTO. Part III is an economic discussion of what has been 
accomplished within the WTO/GATT system and what has not, while Part IV provides a 
brief conclusion. 
 
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
 Subsidies are of concern to the members of the WTO/GATT system for three 
reasons. First, subsidies can undermine market access commitments by importing 
nations. Promises to reduce or eliminate the use of traditional instruments of protection 
like tariffs and quotas can prove worthless if other instruments of import protection are 
substituted for them, and new subsidy programs are one such instrument. 
 
 Second, and related, subsidies can divert customers from one exporting nation to 
another. The benefits to exporters of market access commitments secured through 
international negotiations are threatened just as much by subsidies to competing 
exporters in third countries as by subsidies to import-competing industries in the nations 
that make commitments.  
 
 Finally, and somewhat more amorphously, subsidies are said by many observers 
to "tilt the playing field" in a way that is unfair or otherwise objectionable, quite 
independently of whether they frustrate the market access expectations associated with 
WTO/GATT commitments on particular products or services. It is well known among 
economists, for example, that subsidies can distort resource allocation by diverting 
resources from higher valued to lower valued uses. Put slightly differently, they can 
distort comparative advantage and produce a less efficient global division of labor, 
leading to lower economic welfare. In the view of some observers, additional disciplines 
are required to thwart the use of subsidies that result in unfair or economically inefficient 
distortions of international trade.  
 
 Elements of all three concerns are reflected in the WTO/GATT legal system. 
Before discussing the law, however, it is useful to set forth some economic background.  
 
A. What is a "Subsidy?" 
 
 Although the term "subsidy" is quite familiar in economics, it is rarely defined 
precisely. Often it is used synonymously with a government transfer of money to an 
entity in the private sector. On other occasions, the term "subsidy" may refer to the 
provision of a good or service at a price below what a private entity would otherwise 
have to pay for it. On still other occasions, it may refer to various government policies 
that may favorably affect the competitive position of private entities, such as procurement 
policies or programs to educate workers. Yet, it is by no means clear that all such 
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measures are "subsidies" in any meaningful sense.2 Governments engage in a wide range 
of tax and expenditure policies that impose costs and confer benefits on private entities. 
The suggestion that a "subsidy" arises anytime a government program benefits private 
actors ignores the other side of the ledger—the numerous government programs that 
impose costs on those same actors.  
 
 To an economist, perhaps a natural benchmark for identifying subsidization is a 
hypothetical market equilibrium without the presence of government. The classic 
economic models of general competitive equilibrium, for example, are entirely 
decentralized and embody no government sector.3 When the government enters the 
picture through tax and expenditure policies, it will alter equilibrium prices and output. 
Activities for which the net returns are reduced will be discouraged to some degree, and 
those activities can be said to be "taxed."  Activities for which the net returns are 
enhanced will be encouraged to a degree, and they may be said to be "subsidized." 
 
 The difficulty with this concept of subsidization is that it is exceedingly difficult 
to apply as a practical matter. The hypothetical market equilibrium without government 
cannot be observed, and indeed is not clear that the concept is coherent. Implicit in the 
classic general equilibrium models is a capacity for actors to engage in transactions, yet it 
is difficult to see how such a capacity can arise in a large economy without a government 
to create property rights. Further, the deviations from any benchmark equilibrium that 
result from government activity are exceedingly complex. Governments engage in a wide 
variety of taxation practices—income taxes, payroll taxes, capital taxes, value-added 
taxes, sales and excise taxes, and others. Not only are the number of tax instruments large 
in number (and often administered by several levels of government), but the incidence of 
the various taxes (the relative burden of the tax on the demand side versus the supply side 
of the market that is taxed) is often quite uncertain. Governments also engage in 
innumerable regulatory programs that impose costs on private entities of various sorts; 
occupational health and safety programs, environmental quality programs, programs to 
transfer resources to certain disadvantaged groups, and untold others. Finally, 
government expenditure programs provide vast benefits to private sector entities in direct 
and indirect ways, including public education, highways, research and development 
funding, low cost insurance, fire and security services, a legal system, and on and on. 
Even national defense services no doubt benefit private firms by reducing risk and 
lowering the cost of capital. 
 
 Against this backdrop, it is surely impossible in practice to ascertain the "net" 
impact of government on any entity according to the sort of benchmark put forth above. 
Of necessity, therefore, one must search for other benchmarks to determine when a 
"subsidy" exists. 
 
 The simplest alternative is to look at each government program in isolation, and 
to ignore the question of whether any benefits that it confers may be offset by costs 
elsewhere. If a particular program confers benefits on a private entity, a "subsidy" may be 
                                                 
2This set of issues is addressed thoughtfully in Richard Snape, International Regulation of Subsidies, 
14 THE WORLD ECONOMY 139 (1991). 
3See, e.g., Gerard Debreu, THE THEORY OF VALUE (1959). 
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declared to exist without further inquiry. Thus, for example, if a firm receives a loan from 
the government at a below-market rate, one might say that a "subsidy" arises without any 
regard to the various tax and regulatory burdens imposed on the firm.  
 
 A second possible alternative is to assume that generally applicable tax, 
expenditure and regulatory policies affect most enterprises about equally and thus do not 
confer any net "subsidy." Equivalently, one might assume that any subsidy conferred by 
generally applicable programs is uniform across industries, and will be counteracted by 
an offsetting movement in exchange rates. Programs of narrow applicability that target 
benefits at particular industries, by contrast, might be assumed to confer benefits that 
encourage production in that industry. To illustrate, a government might make an 
investment tax credit available to all industries that use durable goods. On the premise 
that all industries benefit about equally and that any affects on international 
competitiveness wash out through exchange rates, such a program might be ignored for 
purposes of identifying "subsidies." By contrast, if the automobile industry is the 
beneficiary of a special tax credit program for investment in automobile manufacturing, a 
"subsidy" might be found as to that industry. 
 
 A third possible alternative is to focus on the impact of government on private 
activities relative to the impact of other governments on similarly situated entities 
elsewhere. In the international context, one might look for programs that seem to confer 
particularly large benefits on particular entities relative to the benefits that governments 
confer on similar entities in other countries. The presumption would be that most 
governments tax and regulate in roughly similar fashion, resulting in similar background 
effects on the competitive position of most private entities—only when a program for a 
particular group of private entities stands out as especially generous relative to such 
programs elsewhere would a "subsidy" be present. Thus, for example, if most 
governments provide a certain range of benefits to their farmers, those programs might be 
presumed to cancel each other out in international trade more or less, and no "subsidy" 
would be found. But if a particular country provides industrial assistance to the 
semiconductor industry in a context where no such aid is provided by other governments, 
a "subsidy" might be said to exist. 
 
 Each of these alternatives has obvious deficiencies. The first has the virtue of 
simplicity, but its essential failing was noted above—by ignoring the offsetting costs 
imposed by government on private actors it raises a great danger that "subsidization" will 
be found where a private entity has not been meaningfully advantaged by government 
programs. Indeed, because so many government programs are funded out of general 
revenues, a narrow focus on particular government expenditure programs without any 
offset for most forms of taxation would lead to the conclusion that there is rampant 
"subsidization" in virtually any economy. 
 
 The second alternative is little more than deus ex machina. The insuperable 
complexities of calculating the net impact of national governments on domestic industries 
are avoided by assuming that generally applicable programs have a neutral impact while 
targeted programs do not. But there is no reason to believe that this assumption is correct. 
Many broadly applicable programs have widely disparate effects on different industries. 
Consider a simple example like public education—it will lower the cost of labor to 
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industries that use educated workers, but it may increase the cost of labor to industries 
that use lower-skilled workers by lowering the supply of such workers. Many similar 
examples might be given with respect to tax and regulatory programs. And, of course, the 
question of what is to be considered "generally applicable" or "targeted" is hardly 
straightforward.  
 
 The third alternative changes the inquiry fundamentally, and treats 
"subsidization" as an alteration in the competitive position of private entities relative to 
similar entities elsewhere. This shift in emphasis perhaps captures the notion that 
subsidization involves "tilting the playing field," and might be defended on that basis. 
But it too raises difficult practical problems. The presumption that most governments tax 
and regulate similarly with respect to background factors that affect the competitive 
position of private entities is highly suspect, and the mere fact that a particular type of 
program exists in one country and not another, or is more generous in one country than in 
another, is at best a weak marker for a program that shifts the competitive balance 
overall.   
 
 In sum, it is far easier to conceptualize a "subsidy" in simple economic models 
that it is to identify a subsidy in practice. Even when a government program viewed 
myopically might seem to afford uneconomic assistance to an industry, such assistance 
may in fact offset to other tax and regulatory burdens that disadvantage the industry. Any 
administrable rule for deciding whether a particular government program is a subsidy or 
not will no doubt result in serious errors of overinclusion and underinclusion for this 
reason alone. Other complexities will be considered below. 
 
B. The Effects of Subsidies on Producers 
 
 For now, let us put to the side the problem of identifying subsidies, and simply 
assume that they exist. What are their effects? 
 
 Subsidies to the producers of goods and services lower the producers' costs of 
production, other things being equal. This reduction in their costs of production can lead 
to an expansion of their output in two ways, depending on the nature of the subsidy. First, 
some subsidies depend directly on output—the subsidy program may provide a producer 
with $1 for each widget that it produces, for example (or $1 for each widget that it 
exports, the classic "export subsidy" discussed below). Subsidies that increase with 
output in this fashion are economically equivalent to a reduction in the short-run 
marginal costs of production for the producer that receives them. In general, producers 
will respond to a reduction in short-run marginal costs by lowering price. Of course, 
when price falls, the quantity demanded by buyers will rise and output will expand to 
meet the increased demand. 
 
  Second, even where the amount of the subsidy is not contingent on output and 
does not affect short-run marginal costs of production, subsidies can affect long-run 
marginal costs in a way that causes additional productive capacity to come on line or to 
remain on line. For example, imagine an unprofitable company that is unable to cover its 
variable costs of production at any level of output, and would thus shut down its 
operations under ordinary circumstances. A subsidy to that company that is contingent on 
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it remaining in business can avert a shut-down in operations—it must simply be enough 
to allow the company to cover its variable costs at some level of output. Likewise, a 
subsidy can induce a company to build new capacity to enter a market when the expected 
returns to entry absent the subsidy would not be high enough to induce entry. 
 
 It is also possible, to be sure, that a "subsidy" will have no impact on the output of 
recipients. Imagine, for example, that a government simply sends a company an 
unexpected check for $1 million. The money is in no way contingent on the company's 
output, or on it remaining in business. The owners of the company will be pleased to 
receive this subsidy, of course, but there is no reason for them to change their operations 
in any way—whatever level of output was most profitable without the subsidy will also 
be most profitable with the subsidy. 
 
 These observations suggest another important issue that must be confronted in 
conceptualizing subsidies. For a government program to confer a "subsidy," must it 
encourage an increase in output by the recipient? If it does not, then it cannot "tilt the 
playing field" in a way that causes detriment to competing producers. But if this question 
is answered affirmatively, it becomes necessary to inquire whether the government 
program in question affects marginal costs in the short run, or has an effect on long-run 
marginal cost that is sufficient to cause capacity to remain in production when it would 
exit otherwise, or to enter when it would not otherwise. Such issues are not always easily 
resolved.4 
 
C. Distinguishing Good Subsidies from Bad Subsidies 
 
 Economic theory offers no general objection to the use of subsidies. As suggested 
above, a "subsidy" need not have any effect on the behavior of a private actor to the 
extent that it is offset by other costs that the government imposes on that actor. And even 
where a "subsidy" program can be deemed to confer a net benefit, any effect that it has on 
the economic activity of its recipients may well be socially desirable.  
 
 Students of microeconomics will be familiar with the proposition that subsidies 
may be used constructively by governments to remedy "market failures." For example, it 
may be difficult for individuals who invent socially valuable things to recoup their costs 
of research and development—depending on the nature of the innovation and the efficacy 
of any intellectual property protection, inventions may be copied by competing sellers 
and sold at a price that will not allow inventors an adequate return to their efforts. An 
appropriately calibrated government subsidy for research and development may then be 
economically desirable.  
 
 Even when obvious market failures are absent, some government programs may 
confer benefits on private sector entities that are collateral to their central purpose and 
                                                 
4Some commentators have proposed that countermeasures under international law should be limited to 
cases where the subsidy in question has a "cross-border" effect via an effect on the output of the recipients. 
See Charles Goetz, Lloyd Granet & Warren Schwartz, The Meaning of "Subsidy" and Injury" in 
Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 17 (1986). A symposium on this proposal, with a 
principal paper by Richard Diamond, may be found in 21 L. & POL. INT'L BUS. 503 (1990). 
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that are not usually seen as harmful. Public education programs may lower the cost of 
labor for many firms, as noted, but even if such programs might be deemed "subsidies" to 
private enterprise in a sense, few observers would regard them as objectionable. The best 
explanation is perhaps that most observers regard public education as contributing to a 
reasonable distribution of opportunities among citizens. Indeed, in some quarters, 
education is now viewed as a basic human right. 
 
 But it is also well-known that subsidies can distort resource allocation. Many 
subsidies simply transfer resources to well-organized interest groups without remediating 
any demonstrable market failure. From the standpoint of an economist, this last group of 
subsidies can be an appropriate target of legal discipline, while the first two groups are 
not. It is thus useful to consider in somewhat greater detail some particular types of 
subsidies that economists tend to deem undesirable. 
 
 1. Protective Subsidies  
  
 As noted above, depending on the nature of the subsidy program, subsidies may 
lead recipients to reduce prices and expand output. Such behavior by a subsidized firm 
will attract customers away from unsubsidized firms. It follows immediately that 
subsidies can be used to protect domestic firms from foreign competition. A subsidy to 
domestic firms that compete with imported goods or services can induce them to expand 
their share of the market relative to the share of imports, in much the same way as a tariff 
or a quota. 
 
 Subsidies for the purpose of protecting domestic firms from import competition, 
and subsidies that have such an effect without remediating some market failure or 
promoting some accepted distributional goal, will be termed "protective subsidies." So 
defined, protective subsidies are economically undesirable for two reasons.  
 
 First, as indicated earlier, protective subsidies may upset the expectations 
associated with particular market access commitments in the WTO/GATT system. If 
nation A receives a promise from nation B to eliminate the tariff on widgets in return for 
a reciprocal commitment on gadgets by nation A, and nation B then replaces the tariff on 
widgets with a subsidy that has the same effect as the tariff, nation A's ability to sell 
widgets to customers in nation B has not improved and its benefits from the bargain are 
lost. When bargains are undermined in this fashion, nations will become reluctant to 
enter them in the first instance. For this reason, protective subsidies can interfere with the 
negotiation of reciprocal agreements to reduce trade barriers, agreements that generally 
desirable from an economic standpoint. 
 
 Second, even if a protective subsidy does not upset expectations under a trade 
agreement, it still distorts resource allocation by affording protection. When domestic 
firms expand output at the expense of imports because of a subsidy, productive resources 
are diverted into domestic production and away from foreign production (wasteful 
diversion may occur from unsubsidized domestic firms to subsidized domestic firms as 
well). Resource allocation is distorted because goods and services are no longer produced 
at the lowest possible cost—domestic firms produce more and foreign firms produce less 
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only because of the artificial reduction in the costs of domestic firms attributable to 
subsidization. In addition, subsidy programs must be financed somehow, and virtually all 
forms of taxation to raise the money necessary for subsidies will cause additional 
economic distortions.  
 
 It is important to note, however, that protective subsidies may be no worse than 
other devices for protecting domestic firms against foreign competition. Comparing a 
subsidy to a tariff that achieves the same level of protection (as measured by the market 
shares of domestic and imported producers), for example, both have the same effect in 
diverting production from lower cost foreign firms to higher cost domestic firms. The 
tariff creates a further distortion by increasing prices to consumers, and pricing some 
consumers out of the market who are willing to pay the marginal cost of production to 
obtain the good or service in question but are not willing to pay the elevated price after 
the tariff is put in place.5 The subsidy avoids the increase in price to consumers and the 
associated distortion. But the taxation necessary to finance the subsidy likely creates 
some other distortion, and it is impossible to say in general whether the subsidy is on 
balance better or worse from an economic standpoint.6 Thus, in an environment in which 
some protection is tolerated for political reasons, it is by no means clear that subsidies are 
a bad way to provide it, as long as they do not upset the market access expectations 
associated with trade agreements. 
 
 The wisdom of subsidies can become even more difficult to assess if one adds a 
political dimension to the analysis. Imagine a society in which the electorate has a taste 
for rural, agrarian life and wishes to see it preserved. The electorate enthusiastically 
supports government programs to preserve family farms. Is a protective subsidy present? 
Or should one instead view the resulting political equilibrium as an efficient transfer to 
family farmers based on the electorate's willingness to pay to see them remain in 
operation? Does the answer turn on the issue of whether the farm program results from 
preferences of the electorate at large, or from deficiencies in the political process that 
allow well-organized interest groups (farmers) to exact transfers from poorly organized 
interest groups (taxpayers)?7  
 
                                                 
5For an accessible treatment of the basic welfare economics of tariffs, See, e.g., PETER B. KENEN, 
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 17-19, 175-77 (1985), excerpted in JOHN H. JACKSON, 
WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS, 40-44 (2002). 
6For a discussion of the relative costs and benefits of different policy instruments that afford 
protection, See Alan O. Sykes, "Efficient Protection" Through WTO Rulemaking, in EFFICIENCY, 
EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 
114 (Roger Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian and Americo Zambetti eds. 2001) 
7These sorts of issues are considered in detail in Warren F. Schwartz and Eugene Harper, Jr., The 
Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972). 
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 2. Subsidies for Export Promotion 
 
 Just as subsidies can protect firms in an importing nation from foreign 
competition, so too can they enhance the position of subsidized exporters relative to 
unsubsidized exporters in third-country markets. For example, suppose that nations A 
and B both export to country C. Nation A then introduces a subsidy that lowers the cost 
of its exports to country C, and its exporters lower their prices on exports to country C as 
a result. Nation B will then see its share of exports to country C diminish while nation A 
will see its share expand. 
 
 This diversion of exports from one nation to another can result from any subsidy 
that causes firms engaged in exporting to expand their output.  Thus, it may or may not 
be intended by the government that grants the subsidy, and may or may not result from a 
subsidy that responds sensibly to market failure.  
 
 A particular set of subsidy practices, however, seems clearly aimed at inducing an 
expansion of exports—namely, subsidies that are contingent in one way or another on the 
volume of exports. Such "export subsidies" may take the simple form of a fixed payment 
for every unit of a good or service that is exported, or may take more subtle forms such as 
below-market export financing or insurance, tax benefits for exportation, and many other 
measures. 
 
 From an economic standpoint, export subsidies are generally undesirable. First, 
export subsidies diminish market access opportunities for competing exporters, and can 
upset their expectations pursuant to negotiated trade agreements. Trade agreements then 
become less valuable to them, other things being equal, and fewer such agreements may 
be entered. Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, competing exporters may prevail on 
their governments to establish subsidy programs of their own to restore competitive 
balance. The resulting battle of competing subsidy programs then dissipates resources on 
a broader scale for no useful economic purpose. 
 
 The other distortions associated with export subsidies are entirely familiar. By 
inducing the expansion of higher cost exporters at the expense of lower cost exporters, 
exported goods and services are no longer produced at the lowest possible cost. And the 
taxes used to finance the subsidy programs create further distortions that depend on the 
method of taxation.  
 
 Against these distortions associated with export subsidies, it is almost impossible 
to devise any scenario in which they might be economically justified. Although it is 
possible to imagine several settings in which a nation's exports may be "too low" from an 
economic standpoint, an export subsidy is most unlikely to be the optimal remedy. 
 
 First, exports may be uneconomically low because export subsidies by other 
nations have diverted business toward their exporters. But the appropriate response to 
that problem is an agreement among nations to eschew export subsidies, not a policy of 
competing subsidies that can exacerbate waste while doing nothing to eliminate the 
distortions of subsidization. Second, exports may be low because of protectionist policies 
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in export markets. Such barriers are a subject of direct negotiation under trade 
agreements, however, and can be dismantled directly through those negotiations. To the 
extent that protection must remain in the system for political reasons, attempts by 
exporting nations to overcome it through export subsidies will likely just result in more 
protection to counteract them.  Third, exports might be said to be low because of some 
distortion in foreign exchange markets that causes an exporting nations' currency to be 
overvalued. Even assuming that "overvaluation" can occur by some sensible criterion, 
however, the proper response to it is currency market intervention or a change in the 
macroeconomic policies that cause overvaluation, not industry-by-industry export 
subsidies. Fourth, exports might be too low because of some market imperfection in an 
industry that causes its output to be too low—perhaps the returns to innovation are hard 
to capture, for example, so that an industry does too little research and development and 
loses share in world markets as a result. But the appropriate subsidy response here is not 
an export subsidy, but an R&D subsidy. The general point is that while various market 
imperfections might affect exports and a subsidy may be a proper policy response to 
some of those imperfections, the proper subsidy will be conditioned not on exports per se 
but on the activity that is undersupplied due to market failure (research in our example). 
Finally, exports in an industry might be too low because that industry is "overtaxed" by 
its own government in some sense, raising its costs and reducing its competitiveness 
uneconomically. But again the optimal remedy is not an export subsidy but a general 
reduction in the industry's tax burden. 
 
 This list of scenarios in which exports are in some sense "too low" may be 
incomplete, and perhaps the reader can imagine others. Yet, I think it exceedingly 
unlikely that an important class of cases exists in which export subsidies are the best 
response to any market imperfection—some other policy instrument, such as a different 
type of subsidy operating directly on the distorted behavioral margin, or a multilateral 
agreement to eschew export promotion policies, will almost certainly dominate the export 
subsidy. 
 
D. Subsidized Imports from the Importing Country's Perspective 
 
 The fact that subsidies may distort resource allocation hardly means that everyone 
will be harmed by them. Trivially, the direct recipients of subsidies can only benefit from 
them even if the economy of the subsidizing nation as a whole suffers. Likewise, the 
consumers of subsidized goods and services will enjoy the lower prices that result from 
subsidies, even if taxpayers at large and unsubsidized producers suffer. The fact that 
some groups gain from subsidies and some groups lose, even when the subsidies are 
economically undesirable considering gains and losses in the aggregate, creates 
constituencies for subsidization that may prevail politically regardless of economic logic. 
 
 Of particular relevance to the WTO/GATT legal system is the perspective of 
importing nations regarding subsidized imports. In general, nations benefit from a 
reduction in the prices of goods that they import. It is straightforward to demonstrate in 
the standard case of a competitive industry that the economic losses to import-competing 
domestic firms are outweighed by the gains to domestic consumers from the opportunity 
to purchase goods or services more cheaply. The intuition for this result draws on the fact 
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that domestic firms hurt by lower prices can economize on their losses by shifting 
productive resources to activities with higher returns, while domestic consumers gain not 
only the price reduction on all units purchased at the previously higher price, but reap 
additional gains from the opportunity to purchase more units at a lower price.8 The net 
gain to an importing nation from lower priced imports does not depend in any way on the 
reason why price declines—a price decline due to foreign subsidies has the same 
economic consequences in the standard case as an equivalent price decline due to other 
factors. This observation lies behind a well-known economists’ quip to the effect that the 
proper response of an importing nation to subsidies that lower the price of imports is to 
"send a thank-you note to the embassy." 
 
 To be sure, it is possible to devise scenarios in which subsidies granted by foreign 
governments to their exporting firms can be harmful to an importing nation. One 
possibility is that the subsidy may drive out all competitors of the subsidized firm(s) 
under circumstances where it is difficult for competitors to re-enter the market later, 
leaving the subsidized firm(s) with monopoly power that results in higher (rather than 
lower) prices.9 Related possibilities are explored in the literature on "strategic trade 
policy," which develops economic models in which subsidies are employed to expand the 
market share of firms in industries that yield better than competitive returns due to the 
presence of monopoly profits or positive externalities—it is theoretically possible in such 
models that subsidies will produce a net loss to nations that import the subsidized goods 
or services.10 A thorough examination of this literature would take us far afield, and it is 
enough to note here that these scenarios represent special cases. For the bulk of industries 
that operate under competitive conditions, subsidies to exporting firms will confer net 
benefits on nations that import their production.11  
 
 The proposition that importing nations usually benefit from the opportunity to 
buy subsidized goods or services from abroad is plainly at odds with the popular notion 
that subsidized imports are "unfairly traded." Economists have relatively little to say 
about what is fair or unfair, and I take no position on the question whether a principled 
fairness argument offers an objection to subsidized imports. I note only that the same 
political constituency that benefits from any form of trade protection—namely, import-
competing domestic firms—will benefit from countermeasures against subsidized 
imports as well. Many countries have national laws that authorize countermeasures 
against subsidized imports under specified conditions. These laws are termed 
"countervailing duty laws," and will be discussed in more detail below.  
                                                 
8See the diagrammatic exposition in Kenen, supra note 4. 
9See Janusz Ordover, Alan Sykes & Robert Willig, Unfair International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. & POLITICS 323 (1983). 
10See, e.g., James Brander & Barbara Spencer, Export Subsidies and International Market Share 
Rivalry, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985); Avinash Dixit and Alan Kyle, The Use of Protection and Subsidies 
for Entry Promotion and Deterrence, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1982); Jonathan Eaton and Gene 
Grossman, Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly, 101 Q. J. ECON. 386 (1986); Paul 
Krugman, Industrial Organization and International Trade, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION, VOL. II, 1179-1223 (Richard Schmalansee & Robert Willig eds. 1989). 
11A detailed exploration of the impact of subsidies on the welfare of importing nations, including a 
discussion of the strategic trade literature, may be found in Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989). 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND  
 
 The original drafters of GATT in 1947 paid little heed to the trade issues 
associated with subsidies. GATT's lack of attention to the matter was quickly perceived 
to be unsatisfactory, however, the subsequent history of the WTO/GATT system reflects 
steadily increasing discipline on the use of subsidies by member nations.  
 
A. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the GATT System Prior to the Uruguay 
Round 
 
 The original GATT contained limited provisions with respect to subsidies and 
countervailing measures, which were embodied in Articles XVI, II, VI and III. Like all of 
the GATT, these provisions applied to trade in goods but not to trade in services.  
 
 GATT Article XVI originally consisted of a single paragraph containing a loose 
reporting requirement with respect to subsidies that operated to reduce imports or 
increase exports. Article II:2(b) of GATT authorized the use of countervailing duties (and 
antidumping duties), even if they resulted in tariff rates that exceeded negotiated tariff 
commitments, as long as they were imposed in accordance with Article VI. Article VI in 
turn imposed three significant requirements on the use of countervailing duties. First, any 
such duty could not exceed the estimated amount of the "bounty or subsidy" granted on a 
product, although no definition of those terms was included. Second, duties could not be 
imposed unless "the effect of the...subsidization...is such as to cause or threaten material 
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the 
establishment of a domestic industry." Finally, to the extent that subsidies might result in 
lower prices for exportation that could be treated as dumping, no product could be 
subjected to both antidumping and countervailing duties "to compensate for the same 
situation."12 A final provision bearing on the use of subsidies was Article III:8(b). The 
"national treatment" requirements of Article III broadly required member nations to treat 
domestic and imported products alike for purposes of domestic tax and regulatory 
policies. Paragraph 8(b) created an exception, statin0067 that Article III did not "prevent 
the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers." 
 
 Thus, the original GATT was quite tolerant of subsidies. It did acknowledge the 
permissibility of countervailing duties when import-competing industries were injured by 
subsidies, and it undertook to limit those duties to an amount that would offset the 
subsidy. 
 
 These rules were soon perceived to be inadequate. The first development came 
with respect to subsidy policies that upset market access expectations under tariff 
commitments. As early as 1950, a working party found that an unexpected change in 
subsidy policy that disadvantaged imported goods relative to domestic competitors could 
be found to deny the benefits associated with a tariff concession, and thus to constitute 
                                                 
12GATT Art. VI: 3,5 and 6. 
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what is termed a "nonviolation nullification or impairment" of GATT benefits that gives 
rise to a right of redress under the dispute settlement provisions of Article XXIII.13 
 
 Article XVI was later amended during a 1954-55 review session to add some 
commitments to reduce the use of export subsidies. With respect to subsidies on "primary 
products,"14 the obligation was to avoid the application of subsidies that resulted in a 
nation obtaining a "more than equitable share of world export trade." For products other 
than primary products, the obligation was to avoid subsidies that resulted in a price for 
exportation of a product that was below the price charged for the like product in the 
domestic market.15 Of course, "export subsidies" as defined above will indeed tend to 
lead to export prices that are below home market prices, and thus the amended Article 
XVI amounted to something close to a prohibition on the use of export subsidies on other 
than primary products (although a complaining member nation would likely have had to 
show a price differential to prevail in the event of a complaint). These amendments, 
however, were not accepted by all GATT signatories.16  
 
 In 1960, a GATT working party devised an "illustrative list" of practices that 
would likely result in the two-tier pricing structure that would violate the obligations of 
Article XVI with respect to other than primary products. The working party report was 
"adopted" by the GATT membership and thus became an authoritative basis for 
determining whether a violation of those obligations was present.17  
 
 The next stage in the evolution of GATT Subsidies law was an agreement 
popularly known as the "Subsidies Code," negotiated during the Tokyo Round of the late 
1970's. Its principal achievements were three: it tightened the restrictions on the use of 
export subsidies; it elaborated the procedures that must be followed in investigations that 
may lead to the use of countervailing duties; and it identified some criteria to be 
examined in determining whether subsidized imports were a cause or threat of material 
injury. The illustrative list of export subsidies was included in the Code as an annex. Like 
the amendments to Article XVI, however, the Code was accepted by only a limited 
number of GATT signatories. 
 
 In sum, the legal environment prior to the Uruguay Round had the following 
essential characteristics: 
 
—subsidies were generally permissible for domestic producers, although a number of 
GATT signatories had accepted obligations to reduce the use of export subsidies, 
especially on other than primary products. 
                                                 
13See Report of the Working Party, Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Nitrate, II BISD 188 (1952)( 
adopted April 3, 1950). 
14These were defined as any product of farm, forest or fishery, or a mineral, in its natural form or else 
processed to the point customarily required for it to be marketed in substantial quantities in international 
trade. See GATT Ad Art. XVI. 
15GATT Art. XVI:3-4. 
16For a discussion of their legal status within the GATT system, see John H. Jackson, WORLD 
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 371-76 (1969). 
17See GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 185 (1961). 
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—countervailing duties were permissible if calibrated to the amount of subsidization and 
based on a finding of injury; a number of signatories had also agreed in the Subsidies 
Code to follow certain procedures in investigating subsidy allegations. 
 
—new subsidy programs that frustrated market access expectations associated with tariff 
concessions were understood to constitute a violation of GATT. 
 
 GATT disputes through the years were clustered around these basic principles. 
Thus, a few cases challenged subsidy practices as impermissible export subsidies.18 
Occasionally, a dispute would arise over whether a countervailing duty had been imposed 
in excess of the amount of the subsidy bestowed on the product in question.19 And new 
subsidy programs might be challenged as upsetting the expectations associated with tariff 
concessions.20 
 
 As for the use of countervailing duties in the GATT system, their use was 
relatively uncommon. The United States employed them far more often than any other 
nation. Between 1980 and 1991, only 128 definitive countervailing duties were reported 
to the GATT Secretariat by all members combined. Of that total, 110 were imposed by 
the United States.21 
 
B. The Uruguay Round Agreements 
 
 Two new WTO agreements (in addition to the old GATT which survives in the 
WTO) bear importantly on the issue of subsidies—the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), and the Agreement on Agriculture. (The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services essentially defers subsidies issues to future 
negotiations.). The agreements are extremely detailed, and I will not attempt to survey all 
of their legal provisions. Instead, this section lays out the features that raise the most 
interesting and important economic issues. 
 
 1. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  
 
 The SCM Agreement adds a great deal to the law that existed before it. It applies 
only to trade in goods, however, and its restrictions on the use of subsidies do not apply 
to agricultural subsidies that conform to the requirements of the Agreement on 
Agriculture during the "implementation period" of that Agreement.  
 
                                                 
18See, e.g., Report of the GATT Panel ,DISC—United States Tax Legislation, BISD 23rd Supp. 98 
(1977) (presented to the Council of Representatives on November 12, 1976). This report was not adopted 
until a compromise arrangement in 1981 produced a declaration that affirmed the principles in footnote 59 
of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. The United States then replaced DISCs with Foreign Sales 
Corporations (FSCs), a meaure that has been successfully challenged before the WTO.  
19See Report of the GATT Panel , United States—Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Pork from Canada,. BISD 38th Supp. 30 (1991) (adopted oJuly 11,1991). 
20See Report of the GATT Panel, EEC—Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of 
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, BISD 37th Supp. 86 (1990) (adopted January 25, 1990). 
21See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 768 (1995). 
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 The GATT and even the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code contained no definition of 
the term "subsidy." Part I of the SCM agreement defines "subsidy" in some detail. It 
entails a "financial contribution by a government," in the form of (i) a direct transfer of 
funds, (ii) a decision to forego revenue that is "otherwise due," (iii) the provision of 
goods and services, or (iv) an income or price support scheme, if the financial 
contribution confers a "benefit."22 The requirement that a benefit be conferred makes 
clear that not all government programs are subsidies—if a government provides goods 
and services at market prices, for example, no benefit arises and thus no subsidy exists. 
 
 The fact that a program is a "subsidy" by this definition is not enough to subject it 
to WTO constraints. Rather, only subsidies that are "specific" are subject to possible 
condemnation under WTO law, or to countervailing duties by WTO members. The 
concept of specificity originated in U.S. law, and relates to the degree of targeting in the 
government program at issue. Subsidies that are expressly limited to "certain enterprises" 
are specific, that term left undefined. By contrast, when the program does not "favour 
certain enterprises over others," but is available on the basis of "objective criteria or 
conditions" to enterprises at large, it is not specific—an example given of such a criterion 
would be the number of employees in an enterprise. Subsidies that appear on their face to 
be non-specific, however, can become specific as applied. Further, subsidies that are 
limited to a particular geographic region within the jurisdiction of the administering 
authority are defined to be specific.23 
 
 A major innovation in the Agreement was the creation of a "red light, yellow 
light, green light" system to govern subsidies. Two types of "red light" subsidies are 
completely prohibited—export subsidies, including all subsidies listed in the illustrative 
list now attached as Annex I, and subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over 
imported goods. All such subsidies are defined to be "specific" regardless of their 
details.24 
 
 The "yellow light" subsidies are termed "actionable" subsidies—they are not 
prohibited altogether, but may be challenged under certain conditions. A subsidy is 
actionable if it is specific and if it causes one of three types of to another member: (a) 
injury to a domestic industry; (b) impairment of the benefits of a tariff concession; or (c) 
"serious prejudice to the interests of another Member."25 The first two concepts are 
familiar from earlier GATT law—injury was required in connection with the use of 
countervailing duties, and new subsidies were understood to have the potential to impair 
the benefits of tariff concessions.  Previously, however, only the second type of subsidy 
was a violation of GATT law. Subsidies that merely caused injury to an industry in an 
importing nation were permitted but could be countervailed.   
 The new conception of harm that did not exist in prior GATT law is "serious 
prejudice." The types of harm that can justify a finding of serious prejudice include a loss 
of exports by the complaining member to the home market of the subsidizing member, 
and a loss of exports by the complaining member to exporters from the subsidizing 
                                                 
22SCM Agreement Art. 1.1. 
23Id. Art. 2 & n.2. 
24Id. Arts. 3 & 2.3. 
25Id. Art. 5. 
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member in a third country market. Thus, the notion of serious prejudice makes subsidies 
potentially actionable anytime they cause injury to the export industries of other 
members. Prior law is thereby extended in two ways: an action may be brought when a 
subsidy displaces exports from the complaining member to a third country market, and an 
action may be brought when a subsidy displaces exports from the complaining member to 
the market of the subsidizing country, even if the subsidy would not be deemed to impair 
market access expectations associated with a tariff commitment (as in a case where there 
was no tariff binding, or where the subsidy already existed at the time of the tariff 
negotiations). The burden of proof to show serious prejudice is on the complaining 
member in general, except when the subsidies are of a particular magnitude or type (such 
as ad valorem subsidization of a product in excess of five percent of its value, or 
subsidies to cover operating losses). In those cases the subsidizing member has the 
burden of proving the absence of serious prejudice.26 
 
 The "green light" subsidies were introduced on an experimental basis for a five-
year period, which expired in the year 2000. At present, the experiment has not been 
renewed. While the "green light" provisions were in effect, certain types of subsidies 
were "non-actionable" even if they were specific and caused one of the harms 
enumerated above. The three categories of subsidies temporarily insulated from challenge 
were: (i) certain R & D subsidies; (ii) certain regional development subsidies; and (iii) 
certain subsidies for environmental compliance costs.27 Nations that complied with the 
restrictions in each category could grant the subsidies without fear of challenge or 
countervailing measures—the green light rules thus created "safe harbors" for the 
enumerated government programs. 
 
 Much of the SCM Agreement pertains to the imposition of countervailing duties, 
and sets forth a variety of substantive and procedural restrictions on their use. In large 
part these were also found in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. Substantively, the 
agreement makes clear that market benchmarks should be sued in valuing subsidies,28 
and requires that "all relevant factors" be considered in determining whether injury is 
present.29 
 
 2. Agriculture 
 
 Agricultural subsidies remain widespread in the global economy, and the 
Agreement on Agriculture undertakes to limit them. It falls far short of the disciplines 
contained in the SCM Agreement, however, and was envisioned simply as a first step 
toward addressing a situation that had become quite unsatisfactory under GATT. 
 In particular, GATT Article XVI contained a "loophole" for subsidies on primary 
products, which include all basic agricultural commodities. While amended Article XVI 
generally prohibited export subsidies on other than primary products, the rule for primary 
products was that export subsidies should not result in the subsidizing nation obtaining a 
"more than equitable share" of world export trade in the subsidized product. After some 
                                                 
26Id. Art. 6. 
27Id. Art. 8.2. 
28Id. Art. 14. 
29Id. Arts. 15-16. 
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wrangling, this test was ultimately found to be too vague to be enforceable, with the 
result that agricultural export subsidies were completely undisciplined. As noted, GATT 
had little to say about domestic subsidies either, and so agricultural subsidies became 
rampant (and still are). 
 
 During the Uruguay Round, efforts were made to negotiate limits on agricultural 
subsidies, but it was clear that major players such as the European Union, the United 
States and Japan were unwilling to accept dramatic reductions in their farm programs. A 
decision was made to devise an agreement that could facilitate a gradual reduction in 
such subsidies over time, by treating them in much the same way as the GATT treats 
tariffs on goods. Both export subsidies and domestic subsidies became the subject of 
specific commitments, and nations agreed to limit certain types of domestic and export 
support programs in accordance with negotiated ceilings. The permissible level of 
subsidies is scheduled to decline over time, and it is anticipated that future negotiations 
will produce further reductions.  
 
 Annex 2 of the Agreement exempts certain types of domestic support programs 
from the negotiated commitments. Generally speaking, the types of programs that are 
exempt are those which have relatively less impact on output—programs that cushion the 
incomes of farmers, for example, without encouraging them to increase their production. 
Article 13 of the Agreement also creates some safe harbor provisions for subsidies that 
conform to the Agreement, exempting them from countervailing duties and the like under 
GATT. 
 
 The arrangements in the Agriculture Agreement are complex and could readily 
serve as the basis for an entirely separate academic treatment. I will devote relatively 
little further attention to them here, and will simply note that aside from the introduction 
of negotiated ceilings and the exemption for domestic subsidies that have less of a 
distortive effect on output than others, there is little economically novel about the 
approach of the Agriculture Agreement to subsidies discipline. 
 
  
IV. AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE WTO RULES 
 
 There are many subtle economic issues relating to the treatment of subsidies 
under WTO law. I cannot hope to touch on all of them here, and will simply emphasize 
the most general and important ones.  
 
A. Protecting the Bargain under GATT and GATS 
 
 As noted in Part I of this chapter, part of the concern about subsidies in the WTO 
system relates to the possibility that they will undermine the market access expectations 
associated with the commitments that members have made to each other. Not all 
subsidies do so, of course, only subsidies that are unexpected and that alter the 
competitive balance between exporters and their domestic competitors in a manner that 
trade negotiators did not anticipate.  
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 Both GATT and GATS respond sensibly to this issue with the "nonviolation 
nullification or impairment" doctrine. Any change in policy by member governments, 
including the introduction of new subsidies, may be shown to deny benefits that members 
reasonably expected to obtain as a result of negotiated concessions. Once this showing 
has been made, the complaining member is entitled to redress in the form of a withdrawal 
of the offending measure, or other trade compensation. This policy protects the value of 
the bargain for all members and thereby encourages more bargains to be struck. 
 
 A nice feature of the nonviolation doctrine is the fact that it does not require 
subsidies to be carefully defined or measured. A complaining member need simply 
demonstrate that an unanticipated government program has improved the competitive 
position of domestic firms at the expense of their foreign competition. The administration 
of the doctrine is thus reasonably straightforward, and the fighting issue is likely to be 
whether the government policy in question was foreseen by trade negotiators. On that 
issue, WTO law has also moved sensibly in the direction of a rebuttable presumption that 
measures introduced subsequent to a tariff negotiation are unanticipated. For measures 
extant at the time of the negotiation in question, a rebuttable presumption arises that their 
effects on the market in question could be anticipated.30 
 
 The nonviolation doctrine is of no help, however, in addressing the other reasons 
for concern about subsidies. In particular, it has no bite when a third country introduces 
new subsidies that result in shift in business toward its exporters. And it does nothing to 
address the problem of subsidies that create other economic distortions. These problems 
bring us to the much more complex (and problematic) rules found in the Agreement on 
SCM.  
 
B. The Red Light: Export and Domestic Content Subsidies 
 
 The GATT system has long viewed export subsidies as particularly problematic, 
culminating with the prohibited subsidy category in the WTO SCM agreement, which 
makes it illegal to employ export subsidies in goods markets (save for the agricultural 
sector). The prohibited category also encompasses, as noted, subsidies that are 
conditioned on the use by the recipient of domestic over imported goods. 
 
 The prohibition on export subsidies has two convincing economic justifications. 
First, as noted earlier, market access expectations can be upset not only when an 
importing nation introduces a new subsidy to domestic firms, but also when third 
countries introduce subsidies that result in a diversion of business to their exporters. A 
relatively inexpensive way for third countries to divert trade toward their exporters is 
through the use of export subsidies, and history teaches that nations will employ them in 
the absence of legal constraint. The prohibition on export subsidies thus eliminates an 
important policy instrument for export promotion that can erode the benefits of the 
bargain and thus discourage trade bargains in the first instance. It also ensures that 
nations will not go down the road of competing with each other to subsidize their 
exporters. 
                                                 
30See Report of the Panel, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R (adopted April 22, 1998). 
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 Second, even if an export subsidy would do nothing to frustrate the market access 
expectations of other trading nations (as where it is longstanding and fully anticipated), it 
is almost certainly a source of economic distortion. As noted earlier, economic theory 
suggests that subsidies can at times serve as a device for remedying market failure. In 
general, a subsidy to correct a market failure should be made contingent on the activity 
that is undersupplied because of the market failure.31 For the reasons given previously, it 
is exceedingly difficult to imagine a market failure that is best addressed with an export 
subsidy.  
 
 The other "red light" subsidy category, subsidies contingent on the use of 
domestic over imported goods, presents somewhat more of a puzzle. GATT Article III, a 
provision now incorporated into WTO law, permits the granting of subsidies exclusively 
to domestic producers of goods (subject to the possibility that they may be countervailed, 
and now that they may be "actionable" under certain conditions). Such subsidies, of 
course, can encourage the production of more domestic goods at lower prices, and result 
in the purchase of domestic rather than imported goods by buyers. A subsidy to buyers 
that encourages them to buy domestic rather than imported goods has the same effect. 
Indeed, a per unit subsidy to all domestic buyers of a good can be completely equivalent 
in its effects to an equal per unit subsidy to all domestic sellers—net output of domestic 
producers, net imports, and net price to buyers will be exactly the same under 
competitive conditions. One is led to wonder, therefore, why the domestic producer 
subsidy is widely tolerated while the subsidy to domestic purchasers conditioned on the 
purchase of domestic goods is prohibited. By the same token, the prohibition may have 
little economic bite—a nation that cannot use a subsidy to domestic purchasers can 
substitute one to domestic sellers, and probably achieve much the same result. 
 
C. Domestic Subsidies and the Definition of Subsidy in WTO Law 
 
 As noted, WTO law identifies domestic "subsidies" as financial contributions that 
confer a "benefit," and makes them actionable or subject to countermeasures only if they 
are "specific." As such, WTO rules are seriously deficient in relation to a number of the 
problems with the identification of undesirable subsidies discussed in Part I of this 
chapter. 
 
 First, the existence of a "financial contribution" that confers a "benefit" cannot be 
analyzed in isolation if the goal is to ascertain the net impact of government on the 
competitive position of an industry. Often, such benefits will offset by other tax or 
regulatory burdens, and nothing in WTO law permits such issues to be considered 
systematically. Although an effort to sort out these net effects would be extraordinarily 
complicated and fraught with error, to ignore the problem is to render the system unable 
to detect true subsidization of an industry except by chance. 
 
 One argument that might be advanced to rescue the WTO approach in the face of 
this objection has already been addressed. It is simply baseless to assume that generally 
applicable tax, expenditure and regulatory programs collectively have a neutral impact on 
                                                 
31See, e.g, HARRY JOHNSON, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF TARIFFS, 117-51 (1971). 
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all industries, and that only targeted or "specific" programs can be a source of net 
benefits. The folly of such an assumption is well-illustrated by considering the sector that 
most observers would regard as the most subsidized in the world—agriculture. Under the 
specificity test as it has evolved, a program aimed at growers of particular agricultural 
product, such as wheat, would be specific. But a program that gave assistance to all 
farmers regardless of what they grow would not be specific.32 Thus, the degree to which 
agricultural subsidies are "specific" will depend in large measure on form rather than 
substance—governments that bundle farm subsidies together into generally applicable 
farm programs may escape a finding of specificity, while those with multiple pieces of 
legislation that each focus on one or a few farm products may not. Although agricultural 
subsidies are to a considerable degree exempted from discipline under the SCM 
agreement during the implementation period for the Agriculture Agreement, the broader 
point remains. 
  
 It has also been suggested that targeted programs are more likely than untargeted 
programs to be motivated by protectionist considerations—the narrower the group of 
beneficiaries, the argument runs, the more likely that the program in question is a 
"special interest deal" rather than a program geared to some high-minded purpose. There 
may be some merit to this argument, but it seems highly speculative. Agriculture once 
again provides a good example, where the most powerful special interest lobbies in the 
subsidies sphere often secure government largesse that is deemed non-specific as a legal 
matter.  
 
 In addition, even when an industry is a net beneficiary of government largesse, 
those benefits may be socially justifiable. Some industries may be a source of positive 
external economies (most likely in the high technology area), while others may receive 
assistance because of the desire of the polity to preserve them (cultural industries, family 
farms?) Aside from the now expired "green light" subsidy rules, to be discussed below, 
WTO law does nothing to address the question whether the ostensible "subsidy" 
addresses some legitimate problem. The specificity test, in particular, bears essentially no 
relation to this question. Indeed, where a principled justification for a subsidy exists, it 
will likely arise narrowly and case-by-case, so that the policy response will often appear 
"specific." 
 
 Finally, WTO law to a considerable degree ignores the question whether subsidies 
have an effect on the output of the beneficiary, and thus the attendant question whether 
foreign competitors can be harmed by it (and to what extent). There is no requirement 
that the "benefit" from the subsidy have any effect on production, for example. Likewise, 
WTO members are arguably permitted to use countervailing duties against measures that 
confer "specific" "benefits" even if the subsidy program in question has no effect on short 
run marginal costs or industry capacity.33 The requirement of injury to a domestic 
industry prior to the use of countervailing duties might seem to preclude them when no 
                                                 
32This rule is formally embodied in the countervailing duty regulations of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. See 19 C.F.R. §351.502(d). 
33See the discussion of the U.S.-Canadian lumber dispute in JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra 
note 18, pp. 845-51. The suggestion that only output-increasing subsidies should be subject to 
countervailing duties is discussed in the sources cited in supra note 3.   
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effect of the subsidy on output is present, but that constraint has not materialized in 
practice given the way that the injury test has been operationalized.34 
 
 Of course, the requirement that a "benefit" exist imposes some restrictions. A 
subsidy bestowed long in the past, for example, followed by an arm's-length sale of assets 
to another party, may have no "benefit" to the owner of those assets presently.35 Further, 
in any action predicated on "serious prejudice" under the SCM agreement, the respondent 
country may be able to rebut the existence of an serious prejudice by showing that the 
subsidy program in question did not increase output. But on the whole, WTO law does 
not in general require proof that the subsidy in question has resulted in an expansion of 
output that has injured the complaining party. 
 
 The failure of WTO law to require measurement of the net impact of domestic 
programs on an allegedly subsidized industries, to assess whether any net benefit to them 
is justifiable, or to assess the effect of subsidies on output is perhaps unsurprising given 
the enormous administrative challenges that such inquiries would entail and the 
difficulties that would attend any effort to achieve consensus on how to undertake them. 
As a result, however, WTO rules for the identification of problematic domestic subsidy 
programs are deeply and profoundly flawed from an economic standpoint.  
 
D. The Yellow Light, Green Light Approach 
 
 As noted, the SCM agreement goes beyond prior law in making certain domestic 
subsidies "actionable" (that is, they can be challenged as violations of WTO law and not 
simply countervailed if they injure an import-competing industry) even if they do not 
impair market access expectations associated with tariff concessions. The basis for such 
an action can arise whenever a specific subsidy causes injury to an import-competing 
industry, displaces exports to the subsidizing country, or displaces exports to a third 
country market. Subsidies with the potential to cause such effects are colloquially termed 
the "yellow light" subsidies. 
 On one level, the opportunity to challenge such subsidies as violations of WTO 
law is an important step forward for two reasons First, under prior law, domestic 
subsidies that harmed import-competing industries abroad could merely be countervailed 
by the importing nation, which is an inferior option for reasons that will be addressed 
below in the discussion of countervailing duties. As a brief preview of the discussion, 
                                                 
34Agencies that administer the injury test often look at factors such as the correlation between the 
volume of subsidized imports and the indicia of injury to domestic firms, for example, which does not 
establish harm due to the subsidy itself. Indeed, there is a long-running controversy over whether WTO 
law requires injury to be linked to the subsidy, or simply to the presence of the subsidized imports in the 
importing nation. See the discussion of the material injury test in JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra 
note 18, pp. 737-46. 
35See Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products originating in the United Kingdom, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, (2000), ¶¶52-68. The proposition that a sale of assets at fair market value cleanses those 
assets of any "subsidy" previously received may, however, be contested in some instances. If the prior 
subsidy program resulted in the construction of uneconomical capacity, for example, the fact that it is sold 
at arm's-length and remains in operation thereafter would not change the fact that the subsidy had caused 
an expansion of output. 
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countervailing duties do not necessarily discourage undesirable subsidization, and may 
simply divert subsidized goods to other markets. The waste caused by the subsidy then 
remains and global economic welfare may worsen rather than improve. 
 
 Second, prior law afforded no remedy to exporters when a domestic subsidy to 
competitors caused them to lose exports to third country markets. That is, if country A 
gave a domestic subsidy to some exporting industry, and that industry expanded its 
exports to country B at the expense of exporters in country C, the exporters in country C 
had no legal options for redress. A countervailing duty in their home market is of no help 
when the harm is suffered in a foreign market. The nonviolation nullification or 
impairment doctrine is of no use (even if the subsidizing country had bound its tariff on 
the subsidized good) because the loss of market access occurs in a third country market, 
not the market of the subsidizing nation. The extension of the concept of "serious 
prejudice" to cover this scenario thus creates a potentially important new remedy.  
 
 Yet, the notion that the "yellow light" category adds valuable new remedies to 
address harmful domestic subsidies must ultimately rest on the ability of WTO law to 
identify problematic domestic subsidies in the first instance. That proposition, in turn, 
brings us full circle to the issues discussed above. If WTO law does a poor job at 
identifying the net impact of government on industries, a poor job of assessing whether 
government assistance to industry is justified, and a poor job of determining whether it 
has a significant impact on foreign competitors, it is not clear that adding new remedial 
options does anything worthwhile. 
 
 As for the now expired category of "green light" subsidies relating to research and 
development, development assistance to disadvantaged regions, and environmental 
compliance costs, there are two possible views. The more cynical perspective proceeds 
from the suspicion that the WTO can never do a good job of identifying undesirable 
domestic subsidies, and hence that such subsidies should generally be ignored by WTO 
law unless they upset the market access expectations associated with specific 
concessions. Then, any set of safe harbor provisions appears a step forward. 
 
 But one can also argue that the particular safe harbor provisions created by the 
green light experiment (with the possible exception of the R&D category) are 
questionable. A general objection to these provisions relates to the fungibility of money, 
and the attendant possibility that the safe harbor rules will be subject to abuse. If 
government provides resources to a firm with environmental compliance costs, for 
example, what is to ensure that the marginal effect on behavior lies in environmental 
compliance? Quite plausibly instead, the subsidy may be used to expand productive 
facilities and increase output with no impact on the environment relative to the 
counterfactual world without the subsidy (where the firm would still have had to meet its 
environmental obligations). Likewise, when a subsidy is nominally given for research 
and development, how can trading partners be assured the it in fact results in more R&D 
at the margin rather than some other output expanding behavior?36 In short, the premise 
                                                 
36Other commentators have made similar points. See. e.g., William Wilcox, GATT-Based 
Protectionism and the Definition of a Subsidy, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 129 (1999). 
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that subsidies can be dedicated to particular purposes and shown to be used in that 
fashion is shaky. 
 
 More particular objections may be addressed to each of the three safe harbor 
categories. The R&D category presents the best case for a safe harbor, in that research 
and development affords a paradigm example of an activity that may generate positive 
externalities and that may be undersupplied by a private market. Yet, nothing in the WTO 
rules on the subject required any showing that the particular research in question 
plausibly required subsidization. The opportunity to subsidize was present to the same 
degree for all industries regardless of their technological progressivity or the difficulty 
that private actors have in appropriating the returns to innovation. Perhaps administrative 
considerations dictate a blanket approach, however, and if so then perhaps a safe harbor 
for R&D has some logic (subject to the caveat above about the fungibility of money). 
 
 The category covering assistance to disadvantaged regions is more problematic. 
All sizable nations likely contain regions with lower than average per capita income, and 
there is no economic basis to suppose that subsidies for industrial development in such 
regions will address any market failure. To the contrary, they may induce businesses to 
locate inefficiently to take advantage of the subsidy, and simply provide an opportunity 
for the interest groups in pursuit of wasteful subsidies to obtain them more easily. 
 
 Subsidies to cover environmental compliance costs are also questionable on 
economic grounds. To be sure, pollution is the classic economist's example of a 
(negative) externality. But the usual economic prescription for negative externalities is to 
require the party that creates the externality to "internalize" it—in the environmental 
area, the corollary is the well-known "polluter pays" principle. Thus, standard economic 
models of optimal environmental policy call for polluting activities to be taxed, not 
subsidized. A subsidy for environmental compliance costs can abate pollution to be sure, 
but only at the cost of encouraging a larger than desirable scale of polluting activity. It is 
by no means clear why the WTO should create a safe harbor for the inferior policy 
instrument of subsidization. 
 
E. Countervailing Duties 
 
 For the reasons given in Part I of this chapter, countervailing duties usually strike 
economists as peculiar. Subsidies may be wasteful, but even when they are the economic 
loss is generally borne by the taxpayers in the nation that bestows the subsidy. Nations 
that import the lower-priced, subsidized merchandise are net economic beneficiaries for 
the same reasons that any reduction in the price of things they buy from abroad is a 
benefit. When nations respond to subsidies with countervailing duties, therefore, they 
tend to reduce their economic well-being, other things being equal. The suspicion thus 
arises that countervailing duties result when well-organized protectionist interest groups 
use the fortuity of "subsidization" to secure protection from import competition that they 
might not secure otherwise.37 The mere threat to use countervailing duties may also be 
                                                 
37Studies of the use of countervailing duties in practice suggest that they tend to appear in industries 
where the forces of protection are active and are pursuing multiple avenues to obtain it. See Howard 
Marvel and Edward Ray, Countervailing Duties, 105 ECON. J. 1576 (1995). 
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harmful, as it may become the basis for government-to-government "settlement" 
negotiations that raise prices and achieve effects similar to a cartel. 
 
 Exceptional cases may arise, of course, as suggested by the literature on strategic 
trade policy and related work. If a foreign government employs a subsidy to shift rents to 
its firms in an industry that earns better than competitive returns, a countervailing duty of 
sorts may at times be a rational response (as may other policies, such as competing 
subsidies).38 But without dwelling on that rich and complex literature, suffice it to say 
that the industries which fit the strategic trade framework are limited in number. 
Moreover, studies of the use of countervailing duties in practice suggest that they are 
used primarily in established and often declining industries, where technological progress 
is limited and returns are, if anything, below the competitive level. Such industries do not 
fit the strategic trade framework.39 Indeed, nothing in national or WTO law respecting 
countervailing duties is in any way sensitive to the conditions that strategic trade theory 
might suggest are relevant to the use of duties for strategic purposes. 
 
 Outside of the strategic trade area, the only plausible defense of countervailing 
duties is the suggestion that they enhance global welfare by discouraging wasteful 
subsidy practices. Thus, the argument runs, even if the importing nation typically harms 
itself if one takes a narrow view of countervailing duties, under a broader view all nations 
are discouraged from wasteful subsidies, global economic welfare increases and all 
nations on average benefit.40  
 
 This argument is an empirical claim that cannot be verified or falsified as a 
practical matter. Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt that countervailing duties within 
the WTO system do much to discourage subsidies. As noted earlier, they have been used 
infrequently and predominantly by only a few nations (most notably the United States).  
Uncoordinated, unilateral countervailing duties may simply divert subsidized goods to 
markets that do not employ them rather than discourage wasteful subsidies. The existence 
of the injury test as a predicate to countervailing duties is a further obstacle to their 
efficacy in discouraging waste, as it ensures that only a limited number of countries can 
employ them in response to a wasteful subsidy practice. Of course, nations without an 
import-competing industry claiming injury and clamoring for protection might have no 
incentive to employ countervailing duties even if they could use them legally, but this 
observation simply underscores the reasons why countervailing duties will be used 
sporadically and in an uncoordinated fashion that greatly reduces their deterrent value. In 
addition, countervailing duties will never be employed unless the subsidy program 
becomes known to trading partners, and only then after a lag during which the 
beneficiaries of the subsidy may derive considerable benefit.41 
 
                                                 
38See sources cited supra note 9. 
39See Marvel and Ray, supra note 34; Howard Marvel & Edward Ray, Countervailing Duties, in NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. I, 538-41 (Peter Newman ed. 1998). 
40See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 282 (1997). 
41Some of these issues are discussed further in James Hartigan, Perverse Consequences of the GATT: 
Export Subsidies and Switching Costs, 63 ECONOMICA 153 (1996); Larry Qiu, What Can't 
Countervailing Duties Deter Export Subsidization?, 39 J. INT'L ECON. 249 (1995). 
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 For these reasons, it seems preferable for wasteful subsidy practices to be treated 
as violations of WTO law, and to be challenged and condemned as such, rather than for 
importing nations to employ countervailing duties. A successful WTO challenge to a 
subsidy practice, assuming that the losing nation complies with the ruling, will indeed 
eliminate the subsidy and the associated economic waste. One could therefore make a 
strong argument that the provisions of the SCM agreement that authorize and regulate the 
use of countervailing duties are counterproductive, and that the exclusive remedy for 
nations adversely affected by a foreign subsidy should be a WTO challenge to the 
subsidy. 
 
 Before embracing this position, however, one must be careful to recollect the 
inherent weaknesses of WTO law regarding the identification and measurement of 
harmful subsidies. To the degree that WTO law is incapable of determining which 
domestic subsidy programs are truly harmful, the notion that WTO dispute panels should 
get seriously involved in telling governments how they can spend their money is highly 
problematic. On this rather pessimistic view, therefore, the role of countervailing duties 
may be primarily to defuse political pressures for action against "unfair" practices while 




 Conventional wisdom has it that the agricultural sector is heavily subsidized in 
most developed nations. Whatever difficulties may arise in determining the net impact of 
government on industries in general, most observers seem to agree that agriculture is a 
net beneficiary of government largesse.  
 
 It is ironic that the one sector considered to be the most subsidized is subject to 
the least degree of discipline on subsidies (among goods markets). As noted, both export 
and domestic subsidies are generally permissible under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, though subject to negotiated ceilings and some reduction over time.  
 
 The absence of tight discipline on export subsidies is unfortunate for the reasons 
discussed at length earlier. Export subsidies are almost certainly a source of economic 
distortion, and indeed the agricultural sector affords a case study of how pressures for 
competitive subsidization have led trading nations down the road of mutually wasteful 
expenditures. 
 
 The resistance to the elimination of domestic farm programs is likely a source of 
economic waste as well, for much the same reason that any form of protectionism is a 
source of waste. But as indicated in the discussion of protective subsidies, it is hardly 
clear that protection through subsidization is any worse from an economic standpoint 
than other forms of protection. Thus, if the political equilibrium is such that agriculture 
must be protected, domestic farm programs may be no more troublesome that border 
measures. 
 
 One objection that might be tabled to the continued coexistence of domestic farm 
programs and protective border measures for the same commodities (assuming that 
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protection is inevitable) is that multiple protective measures complicate trade 
negotiations. If country A wishes to bargain for access to the agricultural markets of 
country B, it is harder to evaluate the benefits of a tariff concession from country B in the 
face of a subsidy program that also protects farmers in country B. The added transaction 
costs of negotiation in the face of multiple instruments of protection can be avoided by 
channeling all protection into a single, transparent policy instrument—this is the essential 
rationale for efforts in the WTO/GATT system toward "tariffication" of all trade barriers.   
 
 Yet, the prevalence of domestic farm programs suggests that border measures 
alone are inadequate to the task of achieving the anticompetitive purposes compelled by 
current politics. One need only look at the United States, which is a net exporter of many 
agricultural commodities, to realize that import restrictions may do little to ensure 
politically acceptable prices or rates of return to the producers of certain commodities.  
 
 Thus, perhaps the best that can be done is to schedule all the protective policies, 
both subsidies and tariffs, and bargain over both simultaneously to achieve limits on their 
magnitude. This is the approach of the Agriculture Agreement, and one might reasonably 
hope that sequential rounds of negotiations over these protective instruments in the 
agricultural area will produce gradual liberalization, much as the sequence of negotiating 
rounds under GATT brought great reductions in the tariffs applicable elsewhere. 
 
 There is also something to be said for the effort in Annex 2 of the Agriculture 
Agreement to favor subsidies that do not encourage output. To the degree that subsidies 
are being granted for reasons that do not relate to the correction of an externality, 
programs that confer financial benefits on the intended recipients without inducing an 
expansion of their output may create fewer distortions. The caveat, of course, relates to 
the fundamental problem of identifying subsidies in the first instance—an output-
expanding subsidy might counteract some distortion associated with other tax and 
regulatory policies. But in the agriculture sector, where most observers believe that net 
subsidies are present at the outset, efforts to channel farm aid into programs that do not 




 The WTO legal system does a good job in ensuring that unanticipated subsidy 
programs do not frustrate the reasonable expectations associated with negotiated trade 
commitments. It also embodies a sensible prohibition on export subsidies in goods 
markets outside of agriculture, a prohibition that might usefully be extended to 
agriculture and services sectors in the years to come. 
 
 The system is far less successful in addressing domestic subsidies. Its criteria for 
determining which government programs are actionable or countervailable are highly 
imperfect from an economic standpoint, and the challenges associated with efforts to a 
better job are vast. It is by no means clear that general principles to sort unacceptable 
from acceptable domestic subsidy programs can be devised and administered 
successfully. A better strategy in the end may be to embrace the approach of the 
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Agriculture Agreement, which treats domestic subsidies as a topic of negotiation and 
allows nations to agree to reduce them product-by-product. 
 
 Similarly, it is unlikely that countervailing duties serve an economically useful 
purpose. They are simply one more arrow in the quiver of import-competing industries 
that seek protection, and likely have no systematic value in discouraging wasteful 
subsidy practices. Whatever the rules that determine which domestic subsidies are 
permissible or impermissible, an argument can be made for eliminating countervailing 
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